Pipeline safety recommendations
As part of its mandate, the TSB makes recommendations to eliminate or reduce safety deficiencies that pose significant risks to the transportation system and warrant the attention of regulators and industry.
Under the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, federal ministers must formally respond to TSB recommendations within 90 days and explain how they have addressed or will address the safety deficiencies. The Act does not require other stakeholders to respond to the TSB's recommendations, but they usually do.
Using the Assessment rating guide, the Board assesses responses to recommendations according to the extent to which the safety deficiency has been or is being addressed. Once recommendations have been assessed as Fully satisfactory, they are closed. The TSB continually monitors the progress being made on its recommendations.
| Number | The TSB has recommended that | Source report | Current assessment | Status | Watchlist |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| P92-06 | the National Energy Board ensure that, in an emergency, sections of line beyond crossover points on federally regulated pipelines can be quickly and safely isolated. |
Fully Satisfactory | Closed | ||
| P94-01 | the National Energy Board review the records of manufacturing defects in the electric resistance weld seams of other pipeline companies and assess the inherent risk of leaks or failures. |
P91H0109* | Fully Satisfactory | Closed | |
| P95-01 | the National Energy Board, in conjunction with the Canadian Standards Association, re-evaluate the standards for steel pipe manufacturing with respect to the prevention of hydrogen entrapment within the pipe wall. |
P94H0003 | Fully Satisfactory | Closed | |
| P95-02 | the National Energy Board identify and undertake corrective measures for pipelines manufactured to standard CAN/CSA-Z245.2-M1979 Grade 483 Category II operating in environments where there is a potential for hydrogen induced cracking. |
P94H0003 | Fully Satisfactory | Closed | |
| P97-01 | the National Energy Board reassess the design provisions for "emergency shut-down" anywhere in the pipeline system with a view to ensuring the rapid isolation from the flow of product in the event of a ruptured line. |
P95H0036 | Fully Satisfactory | Closed | |
| P97-02 | the National Energy Board reassess the adequacy of the emergency shut-down systems at compressor stations, with a view to ensuring that operators are aware of the operating status of the system under emergency conditions. |
P95H0036 | Fully Satisfactory | Closed |