Associated links (R24T0064)
Near-collision between commuter trains in Burlington, Ontario, highlights need for physical defences against missed signals
Today, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released its investigation report (R24T0064) into a near-collision between two GO Transit commuter trains carrying over 400 passengers in total.
On March 14, 2024, a GO Transit commuter train departed the Aldershot station in Burlington when it passed by a signal displaying a Stop indication. The train then ran through a switch and entered a track that was occupied by another GO Train travelling in the opposite direction. Both trains were brought to a stop by their respective crews, avoiding a collision by approximately 549 feet.
In this occurrence, a catastrophic collision involving 400 passengers was narrowly averted,” said Yoan Marier, Chair of the TSB, “underscoring the need for physical fail-safe train controls that can intervene when signal indications are not followed. For more than 25 years, we have been calling on industry and regulators to expedite the implementation of physical fail-safe train control systems and put strong interim measures in place while these systems are being developed and installed.”
The investigation found that, based on past experience, the crew departing Aldershot station expected the opposing train to have already passed and that the signal would be permissive. During departure preparations, the conductor was focused on his tablet while the locomotive engineer was dealing with equipment issues in the cab, diverting attention from the signal. As a result, they did not observe the Stop indication.
Since 2023, the TSB has investigated eight separate collisions or near-collisions involving signal indications not being followed, demonstrating the limits of administrative defences that rely on consistent human compliance.
Physical fail-safe systems, such as positive train control (PTC), automatically slow or stop a train when crews do not respond to signals. PTC has been fully implemented in the United States since 2020 on high-hazard routes, including those operated by Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railway Company.
Since 2000, the TSB has issued three recommendations calling for such protections, most recently Recommendation R22-04, which urged Transport Canada to expedite implementation on high-speed corridors and key routes. While Transport Canada has cited progress, including proposed regulations targeted for 2026 or 2027 and interim measures, the TSB has assessed the response as Unsatisfactory, noting that meaningful risk reduction is unlikely before 2030. The Board also noted that BNSF Railway has voluntarily implemented PTC on its main line in British Columbia.
Until additional backup safety defences are in place, the risk of accidents resulting from crews not following signal indications will continue.
See the investigation page and backgrounder on positive train control for more information.
The TSB is an independent agency that investigates air, marine, pipeline, and rail transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.
For more information, contact:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Media Relations
Telephone: 819-360-4376
Email: media@tsb.gc.ca