Marine transportation safety investigation M18C0225

Passenger vessel Akademik Ioffe
Latitude 69°43.043′ N
Longitude 091°20.951′ W
Astronomical Society Islands, Nunavut
24 August 2018

The occurrence

On 24 August 2018, the passenger vessel Akademik Ioffe ran aground 78 nautical miles north-northwest of Kugaaruk, Nunavut. The Akademik Ioffe was sailing through narrows in a remote area of the Canadian Arctic that was not surveyed to modern or adequate hydrographic standards, and where none of the vessel crew had ever been. The vessel ran aground at a speed of 7.6 knots before the bridge team could take evasive action; team members were not closely monitoring the echo sounders, and the steady decrease of the under-keel water depth went unnoticed for more than 4 minutes, because the echo sounders’ low water depth alarms had been turned off.

In his assessment of the occurrence voyage plan, the master relied on a Canadian chart that contained incomplete bathymetric data.^{Footnote 1} Because the chart indicated spot soundings that showed localized sufficient water depths, and because the chart did not show any shoals or other navigational hazards, the bridge team of the Akademik Ioffe considered that the narrows were safe to transit, and consequently did not implement any additional precautions. Following the grounding, the Canadian Coast Guard vessels Pierre Radisson and Amundsen were tasked to assist, and 5 aircraft were dispatched by the Canadian Armed Forces. The vessel self-refloated later that night and, on 25 August 2018, its passengers were evacuated and transferred to the sister passenger vessel Akademik Sergey Vavilov. The Akademik Ioffe sustained serious damage to its hull: 2 ballast water tanks and 2 fuel oil bunker tanks were breached and took on water. An estimated 80.51 L of the vessel's fuel oil was released in the environment. No injuries were reported.

The investigation determined that if a vessel’s crew conducts passage planning and assessment based on incomplete and unreliable navigational data, and without taking mitigating measures, there is an increased risk to the safety of the vessel and its complement. Also, if bridge navigation equipment is not optimally operated and automatic safety features such as alarms are turned off, there is a risk that a bridge team will miss critical information, especially in situations where the prevailing navigating conditions create a high workload for bridge team members. Moreover, if the bridge team composition is inadequate during periods of high workload, such as when transiting confined waters, there is a risk that critical navigational parameters, such as the under-keel water depth, will not be properly monitored, compromising vessel safety.

The TSB investigation into this occurrence revealed safety deficiencies that led the Board to issue a safety recommendation.

Risk mitigation measures for vessels transiting Canadian Arctic waters

Transport Canada regulates navigation of domestic and foreign vessels within Canada’s territorial waters, including the coastal waters surrounding the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Fisheries and Oceans Canada, through the Canadian Hydrographic Service, is responsible for meeting Canada’s international obligation to provide hydrographic services; the Canadian Coast Guard is responsible for the provision of marine search and rescue resources, traffic monitoring, icebreaker assistance and diffusion of navigation safety information, among other services. Both Transport Canada and the Fisheries and Oceans Canada, combined, have the regulatory mandate to implement various risk mitigation measures to reduce the likelihood and consequences of a passenger vessel running aground in Arctic waters.

This investigation determined that voyage planning in the Canadian Arctic has unique risks that require additional mitigation measures in order to ensure the safety of passenger vessels, and to protect the vulnerable Arctic environment. Until the coastal waters surrounding the Canadian Arctic Archipelago are surveyed to modern or adequate hydrographic standards, and if alternate mitigation measures are not put in place, there is a persistent risk that vessels will make unforeseen contact with the sea bottom. The Board therefore recommends that

Media materials

News release

Backgrounders

Deployment notice