Air transportation safety investigation A25Q0007

Updated in August 2025: Information in this update is preliminary and may be supplemented or revised during the investigation.

Table of contents

    Engine shutdown and diversion
    Air Inuit
    De Havilland DHC-8-314, C-GXAI
    Chibougamau-Chapais Airport (CYMT), Quebec

    The occurrence

    On 14 January 2025, an Air Inuit De Havilland DHC-8-314 aircraft with 6 passengers and 3 crew members on board was conducting a flight from La Grande Rivière Airport (CYGL), Quebec, to Montréal/Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport (CYUL), Quebec.

    Approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes into the flight, while the aircraft was in cruise flight, the left engine ran out of fuel and shut down. The flight crew called the air traffic control unit to declare an emergency and diverted to Chibougamau/Chapais Airport (CYMT), Quebec, where the aircraft landed without incident. The TSB is investigating.

    Work completed as of 12 March 2025

    The investigation determined that the aircraft had been in maintenance for several months following damage that had occurred to the fuselage and nose landing gear during towing. Because this was the first flight after maintenance, the flight crew was unaware of how much fuel remained after the preceding flight.

    The fuel quantity indicator on the nacelle’s refuelling panel was seized and displayed an incorrect reading. There was therefore insufficient fuel for the flight.

    Before the flight, the cockpit fuel quantity indicator showed that there was a small amount of fuel. However, the indicator had been identified as being defective, and the repair had been deferred in accordance with the aircraft’s minimum equipment list (MEL).

    The aircraft’s MEL indicated that it was possible to use the repeater for the fuel quantity indicator located on the nacelle or to use the magnetic fuel quantity indicator to check the fuel quantity. The engine’s fuel quantity indicator showed that there was enough fuel for the flight.

    Furthermore, calculations made from the flight recorder data confirmed that the cockpit fuel quantity indicator was correct and that more fuel would have been needed in the affected tank. The MEL procedure of comparing the fuel quantity indicator on the nacelle’s refuelling panel with the indicator in the cockpit can lead to errors in determining how much fuel remains.

    On 10 June 2025, the TSB published Air Transportation Safety Advisory Letter A25Q0007-D1-A1 so that stakeholders can quickly implement appropriate safety measures.

    Next steps

    The investigation is ongoing and is currently in the report production phase. The TSB’s internal review process of the initial report is underway, and it precedes the confidential draft report process.

    A final report will be published at the end of the investigation.


    Safety communications

    Safety Advisory Letter


    Investigation information

    Map showing the location of the occurrence

    A25Q0007

    Engine shutdown and diversion
    Air Inuit
    De Havilland DHC-8-314, C-GXAI
    Chibougamau-Chapais Airport (CYMT), Quebec

      Download high-resolution photos from the TSB Flickr page.

    Class of investigation

    This is a class 3 investigation. These investigations analyze a small number of safety issues, and may result in recommendations. Class 3 investigations are generally completed within 450 days. For more information, see the Policy on Occurrence Classification.

    TSB investigation process

    There are 3 phases to a TSB investigation

    1. Field phase: a team of investigators examines the occurrence site and wreckage, interviews witnesses and collects pertinent information.
    2. Examination and analysis phase: the TSB reviews pertinent records, tests components of the wreckage in the lab, determines the sequence of events and identifies safety deficiencies. When safety deficiencies are suspected or confirmed, the TSB advises the appropriate authority without waiting until publication of the final report.
    3. Report phase: a confidential draft report is approved by the Board and sent to persons and corporations who are directly concerned by the report. They then have the opportunity to dispute or correct information they believe to be incorrect. The Board considers all representations before approving the final report, which is subsequently released to the public.

    For more information, see our Investigation process page.

    The TSB is an independent agency that investigates air, marine, pipeline, and rail transportation occurrences. Its sole aim is the advancement of transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.